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Ethical aspects of prenatal genetic diagnostics
Hille Haker

Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities - University of Tübingen

Introduction
In this essay I will consider genetic diagnostics, especially pre-natal
diagnostics, with a brief reference to pre-implantation genetic techniques. I
will focus on a moral discussion of the subject and will try to clarify a
number of aspects. However I will not give a definitive and indisputable
answer to the normative questions which have been raised by new
technical possibilities. To this regard everyone should consider themselves
invited to an open debate, a debate that has as yet been on the whole
conducted badly and that cannot be brought to a hasty conclusion by
drawing on outdated beliefs.
Self-fulfilment ethics and normative ethics
In the past years the difference in terminology between the two
fundamental aspects of ethics has been framed in many different
perspectives. When we distinguish between everyday ethics on one hand
and theoretical reflection on ethics on the other, we can use the concepts
of "values" and "norms" for the former, and the concepts of "ethics of selffulfilment" and of "normative ethics" for the latter. Unfortunately, in the
German-speaking world authors have not yet reached a clear consensus
on terminology: some intend "ethics of self-fulfilment" also as "ethics of
well-being" or as "eudaimonistic ethics", whereas others refer to "normative
ethics" also as "ethics of moral obligation" or as "moral theory" in a strict
sense.
But what do these concepts mean exactly? They refer to two very different
perspectives of the contemporary ethical search, which have two different
points of departure and two different directions: ethics of self-fulfilment is
above all concerned with the idea of a successful life, and is particularly
interested in indicating the concepts of life and values on which this idea is
grounded. This type of ethics also raises issues involving individual and
social experience, history, memory, medical diagnostics and futureprospects, with particular reference to social and individual recognition.
Ethics of self-fulfilment questions whether the moral convictions on which
our practical behaviour is grounded are plausible, consistent and
compatible with our real possibilities. Particular values could be (at this

level of everyday ethics) useful in situations of conflict as they might
provide our conduct with continuity: and, of course, continuity is essential to
us. Although this conduct might be readily shared by many individuals or
groups and therefore develop a specific normative force, ethics of selffulfilment (intended as a theory of practical values and successful life)
avoids judging whether these convictions and the ensuing behaviour are
absolutely valid for everyone. That is, ethics of self-fulfilment analyses the
beliefs of the agents, questions the traditional values, advises those who
need advice (with reference to plausibility and consistency) in situations
where a decision has to be taken, indicates possibilities which had been
neglected or ignored by the agent. Its task is, to a certain extent,
hermeneutic, i. e. ethics of self-fulfilment throws light on the aims and
opportunities of the agent and at the same time guarantees him continuity.
This kind of ethics does not have a prescriptive value, i. e. it is descriptive
and indicative rather than normative (or at least, it has a limited normative
force). For this reason ethics of self-fulfilment is not grounded, as on the
contrary normative ethics is, on the categorical validity of moral judgements
and rights: this type of ethics produces, in Kantian terms, hypothetical
judgements whose normative character is naturally limited; the different
options of actions are subordinated to the aims and ends which the agent
considers essential. The ensuing duties are called, again as in Kant’s
tradition, imperfect duties: they do not have a universal validity and
therefore they are connected to the perfection of the action chosen to fulfil
them.
Normative ethics goes in a different direction. This ethics does not
investigate the personal ideas and aims of the agent: it presupposes them.
As ethics of self-fulfilment focuses on the agent’s interests and rights,
normative ethics brings into play the interests and rights of others. If we
hold that consideration of others is central to morality, this ethics can be
regarded as "morality" in its higher sense. Its task is therefore to question
the justification of actions and the grounds of the rights that are -or could
be- assigned to agents: only the so called "legitimate" (i. e. justified)
interests of others require a corresponding obligation. A stronger
formulation of this concept can be traced in the theories of moral rights,
whose duty is precisely that of making explicit and especially of giving the
grounds for the fundamental rights (i. e. the rights which all humanbeings
share).
The duties outlined by normative ethics require a categorical validity and
expect from all agents the respect of the rights of others, of those rights
whose justification has been demonstrated. The main difficulty consists in
the fact that this ethics must consider the rights of different individuals (not
only those of one single agent) and therefore its task is also to find a
satisfactory balance between these different interests. For this reason a

theory of justice is an essential constitutive part of normative ethics.
The two fundamental perspectives of ethics therefore hinge on choosing
between an individual or a social direction. Not only is the coordination and
ranking of ethics of self-fulfilment and normative ethics an open question
with many different answers; even the evaluation of individual and social
ethics can lead to a situation of conflict. The following framework, while
providing us with a formal pattern for the two different fields, also
demonstrates that they cannot be described one without the other.
Framework
This formal outline provides us with the object of ethics. In particular the
different theories are compared point by point: this might, as I have already
said, lead to problems of coordination. However, the four above mentioned
dimensions give us the opportunity to propose a definition of ethics:
Ethics is the theory of man’s self-fulfilment and duty. It questions the
individual concept of life and social values: both are aspects of the
individual/social aspiration to a successful life. Moreover, ethics throws light
on the issue of rights: rights which are claimed by some and must be
respected by others. Ethics also tries to find a way of balancing the
interests and rights of different individuals and different groups. In this
sense ethics calls upon those institutions and power-structures which are
connected to the problem of rights.

2. Analysis of the problem of pre-natal diagnostics
-Questions of self-fulfilment ethicsIndividual ethics/Social ethics
Individual concepts of life/ social values "Decision making before/ after the
discovery of an illness/ after the diagnosis: values, convictions, ideals
(differences with the partner’s set of values).
Possibilities of integration in the personal history "Attitude towards abortion"
"Attitude towards risks"
Quality of life and well—being: "Cultural concepts: pregnancy, birth"
Concepts of human life "Shared social values (self—determination,
autonomy, family, quality of life, health…)"
Social attitude towards handicapped people and handicaps in general
(normality vs. defect).

- Normative—ethical questions Justification of rights : "Rights of those involved (woman vs. baby?)" "right
to self-determination"
Abortion "The status of the fetus"
Responsibility of doctors and advisers; criteria of advice (non directivity)
"Individual eugenics? (Selection)": "Selection through lists of illnesses and
screening?" "Criteria for advice and for medical conduct"
Some aspects of social justice: sharing of costs in the health service (costs
of pre-natal diagnostics in proportion to total cost) "Benefit payments"
"right to integration, to education and to work?" Legitimation of commercial
interests: "Socially legitimated eugenics"
International aspects of pre-natal diagnostics.
All these aspects outline problems which in the individual case are very
hard to solve. However this brief framework might be of some help in
illustrating, even if only temporarily, public opinion. This listing of problems
opens a wide range of opportunities for individual evaluation and for
practical conduct with reference to the issues of pre-natal diagnostics. This
listing shows that the perspective of those involved is completely different
both from that of professional advisers and of doctors and from that of
society itself, as far as this personal perspective is accessible through
media, literature on abortion and personal experience.
The task of ethical theory is to coordinate the different aspects and, if
possible, to rank them, therefore making possible a moral evaluation
possible.

3. Ethical evaluation
3.1 Towards the concept of responsibility in ethics
In the next part of my fragmentary ethical analysis I would like to clarify my
personal approach. My point of departure will be the concept of
responsibility. In my opinion this concept enables mediation between the
two different levels (ethics of self-fulfilment/ normative ethics). It must be
made clear that responsibility does not only regard others (or the rights of
others) but also refers to ourselves, to our personal history, to our values,
assets, aims…
Aside from the normative dimension, responsibility can be defined as a
(moral) attitude of care for oneself and for others, an attitude which might

well be indicated as basic moral conduct.
In no way does responsibility only refer to present choices and situations:
its horizon is located in the past and in the future. If we intend responsibility
in such a way, the historical dimension of agents is easier to understand: it
is this very dimension which is able to create both norms and continuity in
conduct. When I use the concept of responsibility as the possible mediation
between the different ethical levels, I am asking myself (with reference to
concrete situations) which agents (and institutions can be considered as
agents) are responsible, towards whom and in what way. Although I will not
avoid facing later the problem of responsibility in relation to duties (duties
connected to the rights of others), I will however continue to use my own
perspective in order to indicate the moral subjects who play an important
role in the problem of pre-natal diagnostics.
Notwithstanding the request to extend the debate to include a reflection on
values both as regards the individual and socially, the moral-normative
relationship towards the fetus is central to the discussion of pre-natal
diagnostics. However my opinion is that, far too often, in ethical analysis
two serious mistakes are made: firstly the highly moral request for
protection is limited to the holders of moral rights; these are people who not
only have interests but who are also capable of fulfilling their duties; what is
therefore highlighted is the symmetrical relationship between individuals:
the different requests of rights are handled and discussed with reference to
this relation-ship. It is no wonder that the model for this type of relation is
always the theory of social contract. At this point, however, a question
naturally comes to mind: why should the prohibition to kill (intended as the
negative right not to be killed) be valid also towards children who definitely
are not moral subjects in the sense of "responsible agents"? What I mean
is that the idea that the prohibition to kill is valid for indirect reasons (piety
or reasons concerning the brutalisation of others) does not work as a
description of concrete situations. The prohibition to kill, referred to
children, clearly shows us that categorical duties exist also in nonsymmetrical relation-ships: these duties directly stem from the need for
protection, they do not stem indirectly from the status of the other
individual, from his being a bearer of rights. In non-symmetrical
relationships duties and rights do not converge.
The second mistake is to make use of a reductive concept of personhood
as a basis of the ethical analysis, a concept in which the anthropological
link of body and soul is lost: in Gewirth and Steigleder for example the
capacity of action and of moral thinking is the basis for the allocation of
rights. This terminology, however, is not clear and precise. The origin of the
capacity of action, for example, is not thoroughly considered. The whole
question of "passive rights" or, in more moderate terms, of "passive

protection" remains unanswered: and this is something which cannot be
ignored nor underestimated. In Gewirth’s and Steigleder’s theory of human
personality the central point for the acknowledgement of rights is
exclusively the capacity to develop autonomously personal aims. But aren’t
other aspects of personality —for example the corporal and temporal
contexts, the need for social recognition for the development of personalityalso of normative relevance? And couldn’t these aspects overcome the
weak points of a unilateral vision of personality and therefore enable an
understanding of the fundamental (or imperfect) duties? In this sense the
concept of personhood is important both to determine the agent’s rights —
and with reference to the pre-natal diagnostics of the embryo’s rights- and
to clarify of the so called subject of responsibility. The rights’ issue is part of
the wider context of the responsibility which a person has towards another
person. Responsibility is not, for the supporters of a "moral theory" in its
strictest sense, exclusively related to people, but also to animals, the
environment and so on.
The analyses of rights must however supply us with some practical criteria
useful in the search for a balance in those situations of conflict where two
or more rights are to be considered. In principle (i. e. apart from the ever
tragic situation of conflict) human beings have a generic responsibility to
protect of embryos and fetuses, whatever individual characteristics they
might have. In the field of pre-natal diagnostics there definitely is what we
have called a conflict of rights. Can the change of perspective I have so far
adopted to explain the concept of responsibility be of some help? In my
opinion it can.

3.2 Responsible parents and pre-natal diagnostics
The social changes which have affected the concept of parenthood do not
leave the idea of responsibility undisturbed: it must be made clear whether
donors of sperm and eggs are responsible for their children as "genetic
parents" or if, once they have given their contribution, they leave the scene.
Moreover, it must be made clear whether the State or other institutions
should request, before marriage, genetic tests in order to show the predisposal for certain illnesses.
This is not the place to develop a wide vision of responsible parenthood
under the circumstances of pre-natal diagnostics. It must be however
considered that most of the invasive diagnostic techniques are carried out
for reasons of age. These pregnancies are usually planned and strongly
desired. The moral conflict is provoked however by the diagnostic
discovery of a health problem in the child. By "pre-natal" diagnostics we
intend the chromosomic and genetic analysis of the hereditary

characteristics of the baby, analysis which still has to be clinically
discussed, for it does not allow a precise prognosis of the illness. There is
clearly, for the rest of the pregnancy, an evident psychological (more than
physical) burden for the woman, a burden related both to the incomplete
information given by the diagnosis and to the shattering of the ideal vision
of the baby. Essentially what is damaged is an expected condition which
will take place only after the birth, and this however must not be
underestimated. The question is whether women, couples or parents have
an adequate comprehension of parenthood when they know, before the
pregnancy, that they will terminate it should a pre-natal diagnosis discover
an illness. This can be considered as the first case of responsibility. Before
the introduction of pre-natal diagnostics couples had to ask themselves
whether they would eventually have been prepared to take care of a
handicapped or sick child, and in many cases those couples with a
hereditary problem or in an advanced age decided not to have children.
Pre-natal diagnostics has shifted the problem in the direction of the tests
and of abortion in these circumstances. Nowadays we must ask ourselves
whether parents can make a request for quality — and health certainly is
such a request — into a condition for the acceptance of their child. My
opinion is that parents owe this to their children, especially if we think of the
importance of social recognition: the idea of a generic responsibility
towards human life is not entwined with an adequate concept of
parenthood.
In many cases we do not have the possibility to chose whether or not we
want to take responsibility: we are responsible, without having asked for it,
for example towards our family and our loved ones. With conscious
procreation couples enter the circle of parents as free agents: they are
responsible for their children until they become autonomous. However,
even in the best social and ethical conditions we will have situations in
which women or couples, who initially wanted to have children, eventually
decide they can not take that responsibility. The juridical formulation of this
situation is somehow implicitly given in German Law (218a). Moral
judgement must however wait for the final decision of the woman, she
alone can decide what limits her capacity for responsibility has. In ethical
terms, prescription of duty presupposes practical capacity. In the absence
of conditions for taking responsibility, the requirement of duty, although
valid in itself, is not practically feasible. Hence it is necessary, when
advising an expectant mother, to explain the problem of responsibility
before the pre-natal diagnosis: a specific+ training of the advisers is
therefore needed. Not only the juridical formulation but also the ethical
opinion leaves open a grey area of action, which must be classified as a
particular case of individual choice.
3.3 Responsibility of the doctor in pre-natal diagnostics

The relationship doctor-patient can be considered in two ways. Doctors and
clinical staff are not only responsible for assisting the pregnant woman as a
patient; they also have to assist the embryo or the fetus. The fetus is
certainly protected by the mother from any external intervention; however
the relationship of the woman towards the doctor is fragile, especially if it is
a question of the baby’s health; moreover the technical developments of
the last decade have increased the doctor's possibility of action and
accordingly a reconsideration of the doctor's responsibility is necessary.
His responsibility does not only lie in the decision to practise an abortion. It
also lies in choosing to accept the risk of a miscarriage due to the use of
invasive diagnostic techniques. Up to now this field has been regarded as
an ethical taboo. For this very reason the role and importance of advice
before diagnosis is often neglected: the future mother finds herself in a
situation which she has never really thought about and has to take a
decision without having enough professional advice.
The relationship doctor-patient is always understood to follow the model of
gynaecology and assistance to expectant mothers. Let's consider however
the context of medically advised abortion: its model has its limits and
indeed overlaps with that of neonatology and pediatrics. In this latter model
the parents' autonomy is strongly limited by the baby's right to protection. In
situations of conflict doctors very often decide against the parents' interest,
as far as the baby's life and well-being are concerned. There is a subtle
transition from the model of gynaecology to that of pediatrics. At the
beginning of the pregnancy the assistance to the mother is in the
foreground, in accordance with her autonomy. Towards the end, however,
the fetus gains more and more importance. My opinion is that at this point
professional self reflection is needed, in order to identify the doctor's
specific responsibility, with reference to the pregnant woman, with
reference to the relationship towards a terminally ill fetus, whose illness can
be traced before birth, with reference to the pre-natal killing of fetuses who
would live, with reference to the relationship towards living infants after an
abortion.
Moreover, it will be a specific task of the professional orders to organize
training courses so as to give doctors, social assistants and obstetricians
the capacity to handle a situation of conflict in the best way. In these
courses a fundamental role should be played by the psychological
(treatment of psychological traumas), social (unlimited recognition of
handicapped/sick individuals as a required value for a supportive society)
and ethical aspects.
3.4 Social responsibility in pre-natal diagnostics
I can not thoroughly explain in this paper the social and ethical

consequences of a policy of social recognition of man’s early life; I will not
however dissimulate that I firmly criticise the trend of the past years, that
has lead —in the field of pre-natal diagnostics- to a praxis of "bottom-up
eugenics" , that is to an individualistic and voluntary eugenic behaviour,
grounded however on a form of "voluntary constraint". When exception
becomes the rule the social sense of responsibility fades. Significant
changes of values should always be followed, step by step, by an ethics of
self-fulfilment. When solidarity seems at risk, it is duty of the different
institutions involved to ensure social recognition. This is not only valid for
the public health service, for the medical and non-medical insurances and
for the whole health system, but it is also valid for the instruction system
and for mass-medias, which in particular lead the transmission of values.
The moral culture of a society, and not exclusively its "contingent" national
Law, has the specific task of welcoming its members and of providing them
with an adequate social place. The occidental societies as yet have not
developed such a conduct, and very often too much is asked of us as
single individuals. Gynaecological associations, clinics, rehabilitation
centres, medical insurances, nursery schools, schools and even companies
are institutions and must recognise —in different ways- handicapped
children and adults. One possible form of recognition consists in the stabile
organization of advice and support groups for the therapeutic assistance of
woman and couples. Doctors themselves must respect the responsibility
deriving from the changed relationship towards both their patients. With the
increase of genetic tests this issue is extremely urgent.
Our society will have to prove —in the years to come- whether the shared
values which have grounded our attitude towards handicapped people from
the second world war on will be valid also for the next century. Faced with
the new medical developments and with the continuous erosion of society
such a reflection is essential.
The relationship towards children mirrors the vision a society has of the
relationship towards those who need assistance. Medically assisted
procreation belongs to this context: when the limited acceptance of a child
—which in normative sense I interpret as limited respect- is decided from
the moment of the procreation or at the very beginning of the pregnancy
then not only is the baby’s protection weakened: also the acceptance of
"deviation" from the so called "normality" is at risk. The acknowledgement
that normality in itself is plural and therefore allows difference and diversity
will not be easy to achieve. In ethical terms this shows on one hand the
extreme fragile nature of the concept of recognition in our society, and on
the other it demonstrates that the recognition of the "special" and particular
nature of each of us is a constitutive part of the idea of man’s continuous
development and therefore is the other side of normative equality.

